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Criminal Procedure in a Conservative
Age: A Time to Rediscover the
Critical Nonconstitutional Issues
Richard S. Frase

Criminal procedure is changing fast these days, but teachers of criminal
procedure are not. Most of us have probably given considerable thought to
the philosophical and doctrinal significance of the Supreme Court's
increasingly conservative approach to constitutional issues, but have we
thought about the broader pedagogic and professional implications of this
major doctrinal shift? For me. the current conservative trend raises
fundamental questions about the kinds of issues we should be addressing in
our teaching, research, and public service activities. In particular. we need
to start asking ourselves whether our traditional heavy emphasis on
constitutional issues (which has been going on since before most of us went
to law school) is still appropriate. The answer is no, I believe, at least in the
present conservative age, and perhaps in any age.
There has, of course, been some debate about the degree to which the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has been less protective than was
the Warren Court of the rights of criminal defendants and suspects.' All
would agree, however, that the Burger Court has at least been somewhat
more conservative all along. and many believe it is becoming more so all the
time. Particularly in its decisions since the late 1970s, the Court often has
not been content to merely hold the line on constitutional due process. but
has begun to overrule major Warren Court precedents. 2 while continuing to
cut back or narrowly construe exclusionary remedies5 and the scope of
substantive constitutional limitations on searches and interrogations.'
Moreover, this conservative trend will probably accelerate if, as seems likely,
President Reagan has the opportunity to make one or more additional
appointments to the Court in his second term.

Richard S. Frase is Professor of Law. tTniversitV of Minnesota. The author is grateful to Albert
Alschuler. Barry Feld. Steven Goldberg. and Frank Ziniring for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
i. See. e.g., Yale Kamisar. The Warren Court (,Was It Really So Defense-Minded?). the Burger
Court (is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?). and Police Investigatory Practices, in The
Burger Court: The Counterrevolution That Wasn't. ed. Vincent Blasi. 62-68 (New Haven.
Qonf., 1983).
2. See, e.g.. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Leon. 104 S.Ct. 3,105 (1984): Nix v. Williams. 10.1 S.Ct. 2501 (198-):
and Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado. 10.1 S.Ct. 1758 (198-). and
New York v. Quarles, 101 S.Ct. 2626 (198-1).
0 1986 by the Association of American l.aw Schools. Cite as 35 J. .egal Educ. 79 (1986).
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Thus far, however, these significant doctrinal developments do not

appear to have had much impact on the way in which criminal procedure
teachers define their teaching, research, and public service roles. The only
noticeable response has been the suggestion, by liberal teachers and jurists,
of various ways in which defense attorneys can slow down or evade the
reduction of constitutional standards-by discouraging appeals and
otherwise seeking to avoid Supreme Court adjudication of federal
constitutional issues, by vigorously contesting those issues that still reach
the Court, and by requesting lower courts to define state constitutional
guarantees more broadly than the minimum requirements imposed by the
federal constitution.5 The liberal strategy, in other words, is to go on
fighting the same constitutional law battles, with greater emphasis on
litigation in state and lower federal courts. Conservative teachers are
prompted to respond in kind-defending the current retrenchment of
federal constitutional limitations, and arguing against the adoption of
broader limitations under state law. Moderates likewise seem to go on
playing the same old game with the same old issues, trying to sort out the
merits of broader or narrower constitutional limitations under federal or
state law.
It is time we stopped and asked ourselves whether the old game is still
worth playing-indeed, whether it ever was. Does continued heavy
emphasis on constitutional issues of criminal procedure really serve the best
interests of defendants, suspects, and society? Is it the best way to improve
(or at least maintain) the quality of criminal justice in this country? Is it the
best allocation of scarce legal time, *talent, and intellectual creativity-of
lawyers, judges, ourselves, and our students? I think not. In saying this, I do
not dispute the great philosophical importance of the Bill of Rights
guarantees, as symbols of the relationship between American citizens and
their governments. I also recognize that the obligations of professional
responsibility may force defense attorneys to continue litigating many of
these issues in every available forum. For academics, however, the question
is whether we should encourage such litigation and symbol maintenance,
and divert our own energies from other worthy causes, by continuing to
strongly emphasize these constitutional issues in our teaching, scholarship,
and law reform efforts. For the reasons developed below, I believe that
criminal justice, and our students, will be better served if we deemphasize
constitutional issues, especially certain heavily litigated search and
interrogation questions, and refocus our efforts on reform of certain critical,
but neglected, aspects of nonconstitutional criminal procedure. These
reform proposals may well have the support of conservatives as well as
liberals, thus giving them a reasonable likelihood of adoption and success,
even in the current conservative political climate.
Two preliminary points before I begin. First, this article assumes liberal
normative premises (which I share), and is addressed primarily to moderate

5. See generally, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982).
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and liberal teachers, because they must change their views the most on this
subject. More conservative teachers presumably already agree that there is
too much constitutional criminal procedure.
Second, my thesis should not be overstated; constitutional issues need to
be deemphasized, not abandoned. Thus, despite my skepticism about
whether certain heavily litigated search and confession rules have had much
impact on either the outcome of cases or police practice, I continue to
believe-as do many law enforcement officials-that the existence of
constitutional rights and exclusionary rules has had a beneficial impact on
police behavior, and that abandonment of all exclusionary rules, or further
narrowing of important substantive rights, would encourage serious police
illegality. There may be certain constitutional rights that are so
demonstrably important, either to the truth-seeking function of the
criminal process or to other widely shared values, that they merit-and will
reward-continued efforts to maintain or expand, federal and state
7
constitutional requirements.
What I am saying is that we need to become much more selective in
choosing constitutional issues to teach, research, and litigate. We must ask
ourselves: "Even if courts could be persuaded to adopt or maintain a 'better*
rule on this issue, so whai? Will the rule really improve things enough to
justify the time and expense of creating, maintaining, and trying to enforce
it?"' Asking this question should lead us to deemphasize issues that offer a
relatively low "due process payoff," for one or more of the following
reasons: (1) the underlying due process values are generally perceived to be
of lesser importance; (2) such values are too fact-dependent to yield
meaningful and enforcible rules of law; (3) substantive rights are rarely
applicable, or are unlikely to be asserted by those who possess them; and/or
(4) exclusionary remedies are unlikely to be granted, or to affect police
behavior. Specific examples of heavily emphasized but "low payoff" issues

6. See, e.g., Stephen Hz Sachs. The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, I Crim. Just.
Ethics (Summer/Fall, 1982).
7. One example of such an issue may be the right to counsel at precharge lineups. See Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). criticized in Joseph Grano. Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any
Constitutional Safeguards.Remain against the Dangers of Convicting the Innocent?. 72
Mich. L. Rev. 717 (1974). Several state supreme courts have rejected the Kirby limitation,
and have extended the right to counsel to lineups conducted prior to formal charging,
unless "exigent circumstances exist so that providing counsel would unduly interfere with
a prompt and purposeful investigation." See. e.g.. Blue v. State. 558 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska
1977). It must be recognized, however, that the value of the counsel safeguard is likely to be
substantially undercut by the willingness of courts (already demonstrated in the postcharge
context) to "readily avoid.., reversing convictions by stretching, often beyond reason and
logic, the doctrines of independent source and harmless error." Grano. supra,at 722. Nor
should we lightly create a new occasion for case-by-case litigation of "'exigent

circumstances." See text at note 12. infra.
8. See generally Derek A. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training (Report to the
Board of Overseers, Harvard University. 1981-1982). reprinted in 33 J. Legal Educ. 570-85
(1983), questioning whether many "legal safeguards... are worth in justice what they cost
in money and delay" (at 581), and lamenting the "massive diversion of exceptional talent
into pursuits that often add little" to the social good (at 573).
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include searches of automobiles, and containers therein; 9 informant-based
probable cause (the Aguilar problem): 0 and most Miranda issues."' The

9. In view of the number of theories now available to police and prosecutors seeking to
introduce evidence derived from a car search, and the applicability of most of the "low
payoff" criteria discussed in text (especially the extremely low value on privacy courts
apply in these cases), it seems very unlikely that further litigation or doctrinal analysis will
lead very many courts, state or federal, to recognize broader. enforcible constitutional
protections in this area. See. e.g.. New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981): United States v.
Ross. 456 U.S. 798 (1982): Michigan v. Long, 105 S.Ct. 3469 (1983): Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978): and South Dakota v. Opperman. '128 U.S. 364 (1976). When such
protections are recognized, it will probably be in those rare cases in which a clearly defined
police practice significantly affects the freedom of a large number of ordinary. law-abiding
citizens (that is. "us" not ".them"). See. e.g.. State v. Koppel. '199 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985),
invalidating a drunk-driving roadblock despite nondiscretionary procedures used.
10. I do not mean to suggest that the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" requirements were
not useful criteria; my point is simply that efforts to reestablish these requirements under
state law may not be worth the effort. It is difficult for anyone familiar with the Aguilar
case law to dispute the Supreme Court's argument that these standards had become ":tn
elaborate set of legal rules." increasingly technical and refined in their application. Illinois
v. Gates. 103 S.Ct. 2317. 2327 (1983); indeed. Aguilar could be "refined" to achieve almost
any result. including a finding of probable cause on the facts of Gates see Justice White's
concurrence. 103 S.Ct. at 2347-50). See generally. Richard S. Frase. Criminal EvidenceConstitutional, Statutory. and Rules Limitations 27-29 (St. Paul. Minn.. 1985). discussing
the major pre-Gates cases in the United States and Minnesota Supreme Courts. Such everincreasing complexity and refinement were inevitable, the Court argued in Gates. because
the concept of probable cause itself depends entirely on an "assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts", and is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules." 103 S.Ct. at 2328.
What the Court in Gates did not say, but which everyone familiar with criminal cttrts
knows, is that the "legal" standard of probable cause is no better than the reliability of the
police testimony offered to meet the standard. Since defendants are not entitled to demand
disclosure of the identity of an informant who provided probable cause. McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967), the police can "create" probable cause, and evade even the strictest
Aguilar-type rules, by suitably "padding out" their informant's tip-or simply quoting a
nonexistent informant. Cf. Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine. The Nation. May 8,
1967, at 596-97 (criticizing McCray.) McCrav was a Warren Court decision, and lew state
courts have shown a willingness to go beyond it.
11. Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's recent lament that the Court's new "public safety"
exception to Miranda puts an end to "eighteen years of doctrinal tranquility." New York v.
Quarles. 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2644 (1984) (justice Marshall, dissenting). I think Miranda'sscope
and meaning have been anything but clear from the beginning, and that the rule has
become steadily more complex, and less enforcible. See. e.g.. Oregon v. Mathiason, '129 U.S.
492 (1977) (suspect at police station was not "in custody"); Berkemer v. McCarty. 104 S.Ct.
3138 (1984) (defendants not yet formally arrested or taken to the police station may still be
in "custody"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) ("interrogation" includes more
than "express questioning," but did not include apparent use of a strategem-playing on
suspect's humanitarian impulses-often recommended in police interrogation manuals):
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (waiver upheld. despite suspect's earlier invocation
of right to remain silent); Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (waiver invalid, after
invocation of right to counsel, absent defendant "initiation" of further discussions with
police). In practice, of course, it appears that defendants usually do "waive" their Miranda
rights, and that statements or derivative evidence obtained in violation of Miranda are often
admissible anyway, see note 16, and accompanying text. infra.
If Miranda was not already a dead letter, practically speaking, the final nail in its coffin
was driven by the Court's holding, in Oregon v. Elstad. 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985). that a warned
statement obtained forty-five minutes after an unwarned statement is not suppressible
when there is no showing that either statement was involuntary. Since omt' of the principal
reasons for the Miranda safeguard, however, was the difficulty of determining
"voluntariness" long after the events in question, it can safely be predicted that few post-
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extraordinary emphasis on such issues in recent teaching, research, and
litigation strikes me as the modern-day equivalent of medieval debates over
how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The resulting doctrinal
overrefinement recently led Justices O'Connor and Marshall, in a rare
display of unity, to lament the "finespun ... doctrine [and] hair-splitting
2
distinctions, that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."'
The problem goes beyond the Fourth Amendment, however.
Doctrinal refinement is not necessarily bad, of course, if the underlying
values are important enough, the rules make sense, and they are frequently
invoked and enforced. These criteria are often not met, however. I shall not
dwell on the first point; those with more liberal views than mine may
reasonably disagree about the importance of (in the examples cited above)
limiting automobile searches and broadly defining the substantive and
procedural meaning of a "voluntary" confession. Nor do I expect others to
universally agree with my views on the second point-that such key
concepts as probable cause and voluntariness (however defined) are highly
fact-dependent value judgments that cannot be reduced to meaningful and
enforcible rules of law. Instead, I rest my case primarily on the third and
fourth criteria suggested above, and on the considerable empirical evidence
showing that all constitutional search and confession rules-not just those
criticized above-are rarely applicable, rarely invoked, rarely enforced by the
courts, and rarely a principal reason for nonconviction. Thus, in retrospect
at least, the elaborate constitutional limitations on searches and
interrogations appear, even at their fullest, to be largely symbolic statements
of our political ideals, having relatively little effect on either police behavior
3
or the outcome of criminal cases.'
Elstad consecutive confession cases will result in suppression on voluntariness grounds.
Moreover, the Court in Elstad did not dispute the general assumption that defendants are
very likely to confess again, once they have "let the cat out of the bag." Miranda is dead.
indeed, and it is unlikely to be resurrected by state courts, many of whom had already
adopted the Elstad rule. Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1294. n. 2. citing state cases.
One major reason for these disappointing results is our underlying ambivalence about the
due process values at stake: at least during the early, "inquisitorial" stage of police
investigation, we seem unwilling to enforce a definition of "voluntariness" which goes
much beyond problems of unreliable confessions and brutal police methods (e.g., to
include a right to make a rational, informed choice to confess). Cf. Joseph Grano, Rhode
Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of
Confessions, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1,25-28 (1979) (implying that, after the commencement
of "adversary judicial proceedings," such a broader definition is more appropriate, or at
least an acceptable compromise). For better or worse, this is the value judgment we have
made, and it is time to admit it.
12. New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626. 2636 (1984) (Justice O'Connor, concurring and
dissenting); id. at 2645 (Justice Marshall, dissenting).
13. Cf. Anthony Amsterdam. The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,
45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 786 (1970). concluding that the Supreme Court's constitutional
pronouncements are largely uniformed by-and unlikely to substantially affect--"the
doings in the dark pit in which criminal suspects. police and the functionaries of the
criminal courts wrestle." Amsterdam's pessimistic assessment is remarkable not only
because of its author's indisputable liberal credentials, but also because it was made at
what. in retrospect, appears to have been the high water mark of constitutional due
process-the end of the Warren Court era. For a more recent discussion of the gap between
due process ideology and practice, see Thomas Davies. "Do Criminal Due Process
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The specific reasons why these constitutional rules have so little impact

are familiar to us all, but their cumulative effect may not have been fully
appreciated. To begin with, substantive search and confession rights rarely
apply, or are easily avoided by the police, because the rights themselves have
always been narrowly defined, or are routinely waived. Thus, recent
research has confirmed that most searches occur either incident to arrest or
by consent.' 4 and therefore require neither a warrant nor probable cause to
search.' 5 As for police interrogations, although most were (until recently, at

least) subject to Miranda requirements. the available empirical evidence
suggests that defendants usually waive their rights to silence and counsel."6
Even where Fourth Amendment or Miranda rights are violated, the
exclusionary remedy has long been subject to numerous exceptions.
Defendants lack "standing" to object to even the most outrageous violations
of another person's rights. Derivative "fruits" of the violation are admissible
if there is sufficient "attenuation" of the causal link between the illegality
and the fruits: if the police can show a legal, "independent source" for the

evidence; or (more recently) if they can show that the "fruits" would
"inevitably" have been discovered by lawful means. Moreover, the
defendant is never a "suppressible fruit," no matter how illegal the arrest:
only physical or other evidence derived from the arrest is suppressible.
Furthermore, illegally obtained evidence is almost always admissible to
impeach the defendant's testimony at trial, and may be almost as valuable to
the prosecution in this supposedly "limited" use-or as a means of
discouraging defendant from testifying at all-as it would be if introduced

Principles Make a Difference? A Review of McBarnet's Conviction: Law. the State. and the
Construction of Justice. 1982 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. 247-68; Jesse Choper, Consequences
of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 1-212 (1984), concluding that some criminal procedure rulings (e.g., right to counsel
at preliminary hearing and trial; prohibition of physically coerced confessions) have been
much more successful than others (e.g., Miranda), and that the impact of constitutional
rights and exclusionary remedies in general may be greater than the impact of particular
rulings. Id. at 9-10 (n.27), 15-17. 30-35, 57, 112-17.
14. See R. Van Duizend. L. P. Sutton & C. A. Carter. A Review of the Search Warrant Process,
State Court Journal 4. 6 (Spring 1984).
15. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest in a public place) and
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to custodial arrest requires
neither warrant nor probable cause to search). As for consent, the findings of the study cited
in note 14, supra, suggest that "consent is the easiest thing in the world to obtain ... .you
just make an offer that cannot be refused." As one officer put it:
[You] tell the guy. "Let me come in and take a look at your house." And hie says. "No. I
don't want to." And then you tell him. "Then, I'm going to leave Sam here. and he's
going to live with you until we come back [with a-search warrant.] Now we can do it
either way." And very rarely do the people say, "Go get you get your search warrant.
then."
State Court Journal, supra note 14. at 6. One might add that such "offers" are particularly
irresistible when made to a nonsuspect who has sufficient "joint access or control" over the
premises to give valid "third-party" consent. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
171, n. 7 (1974.
16. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of
Miranda, 47 Denver L.J. 1 (1970), and authorities cited therein.
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in the case-in-chief. If all else fails, courts are inclined to find that any
improper evidence was harmless error, provided (as is usually the case) that
there is other substantial evidence of guilt.
The cumulative impact of all these exceptions and limitations is reflected
in the results of empirical studies of the exclusionary rule in practice:
constitutional evidence problems have little or no impact on the outcome of
federal criminal cases.", and the impact in state cases has not been much
greater.' 8 It is still possible, of course, that constitutional rules shape police
behavior even if they are rarely enforced. In particular, many believe that the
existence of constitutional rights and exclusionary remedies has encouraged
police administrators to increase preservice and inservice training in proper
investigatory procedures, and also encourages police to seek, and
prosecutors to offer, legal advice on constitutional requirements.' 9 It seems
unlikely, however, that police can be trained to understand and follow all
the finer points of current search and confession doctrine. 20 The police
cannot apply a rule they cannot understand, and they will refuse to apply it
if it seems overly technical or arbitrary; for the same reasons, reviewing
courts are reluctant to enforce such rules, thus further limiting their impact
on case outcomes and police practices.
Perhaps the most important practical impact of increasingly complex
search and interrogation rules and remedies has been the considerable
amount of time and energy they have consumed, both for overworked courts
and attorneys and for law professors, their students, and other potential

17. See U.S. Comptroller General. Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal
Prosecutions. 8. 11. 13-14 (1979) (only 0.4 percent of matters U.S. attorneys declined to
prosecute were rejected primarily because of a search and seizure problem: of prosecuted
defendants. 11 percent filed a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress, evidence was
excluded in 1.3 percent of all cases, and half of the cases with exclusion still ended in
conviction).
18. See. e.g., Thomas Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests.
1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 611-90 (in the four-year period 1976-1979, only five percent of
felony complaints rejected for prosecution in California were rejected primarily due to
search and seizure problems, and such search and seizure rejections comprised less than I
percent of matters referred for prosecution by the police; looking at the cumulative effect of
the exclusionary rule through all stages of the adjudication process. only about 2.4 percent
of felony arrests were dropped due to illegal searches); Peter Nardulli. The Societal Cost of
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment. 1983 Am. Bar. F. Res. J. 585. 593-602
(study of 7,500 cases in three sta:es, finding that motions to suppress physical evidence were
filed in 5 percent of all cases (mostly in drug and weapons cases), were granted in 0.7
percent of all cases, and resulted in nonconviction in 0.6 percent of all cases: motions to
suppress identifications or confessions were filed in 5 and 7 percent of all cases.
respectively, were granted in 0.08 and 0.16 percent of cases, and resulted in nonconviction
in .01 and .07 percent of all cases).
It is possible, of course, for a constitutional violation to affect disposition even if the case
results in conviction: the defendant may receive a reduced sentence, reduced charge, or both
as a result of a threatened or actual motion to suppress. The extent of this phenomenon has
not been empirically evaluated. See Davies. supra note 18. at 668-69.
19. See Sachs, supra note 6, at 30-32. For a review of the voluminous literature on whether and
to what extent the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule affects police'behavior. see
Choper, supra note 13. at 30-33.
20. See, e.g., cases discussed in notes 9 to 11, supra.
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reformers of our criminal justice system. We have spent literally millions of
hours teaching, writing, and arguing about matters that, however
important they may be in principle, have little effect upon the outcome of
most cases, and perhaps even less effect on police behavior. This situation is
unlikely to change very much if we begin to give greater attention to
constitutional litigation in the lower courts (except that the law of searches
and interrogations will become even more complex, as courts in fifty states
address the issues previously dominated by the Supreme Court). There is
little reason to think that most lower courts will be much more receptive
than is the current Supreme Court to complex due process arguments in
search and confession cases. Lower federal courts are also increasingly
staffed by Reagan and Nixon appointees; state courts are presumably even
more "political," and thus at least as likely to succumb to current pressures
2
to "get tough" on criminals and disregard constitutional "technicalities.''
Meanwhile, the issues of criminal justice that really matter in most

cases-the rules and practices that directly affect the quality of justice, the
likelihood of conviction, and the severity of punishment-will continue to
receive insufficient attention. Although any "priority" list of criminal
justice issues is admittedly somewhat subjective (and highly dependent on
local conditions), it is not difficult to identify examples of neglected
problem areas and issues which, in most criminal cases and in most
jurisdictions, are more important than the kinds of search and confession
rules which have dominated our attention-without suggesting that these
are the only important alternative issues, or that they are the most important
in every jurisdiction. My own "alternative agenda" of criminal justice issues
would focus on four interrelated problems: unnecessary pretrial detention,
coercive plea bargaining, unregulated sentencing discretion, and
dehumanizing prison conditions. Most observers of our criminal courts
would agree that these problems account for some of the worst, and most
widespread, failures of justice in this country, yet these important issues
were neglected by the Warren Court and by many criminal justice reformers
of the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these problems are difficult to resolve as a
matter of federal constitutional law22-they must be addressed at the state
21. Some states have already begun to retreat from their earlier expansions of state due process
rights. See, e.g., People v. Lance W.,37 Cal.3d 873,694 P.2d 744 (1985) (1982 amendment to
state constitution forbids exclusion of evidence on state grounds that would not be
excludable under federal constitution).
22. Prison reform may be the exception here, in view of the extensive constitutional litigation
of prison conditions, beginning in the early 1960s. A recent review of the "prisoners' rights
movement" (defined to include not only litigation, but also efforts to work directly with
legislatures, executive agencies, and professional organizations such as the American
Correctional Association) concluded that it had "contributed greatly to the reduction of
brutality and degradation, the enhancement of decency and dignity, and the promotion of
rational governance." James B. Jacobs, New Perspectives on Prisons and Imprisonment 60
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1983). The author also noted, however, that prisons remain "too often
dilapidated, overcrowded, underfunded, and poorly governed." Id. See generally, Steve
Lerner, Rule of the Cruel: How Violence Is Built into America's Prisons, The New
Republic, October 15, 1984. In large part this situation may be due to the inability of
constitutional litigation to deal with the fundamental problems of underfunding and
overcrowding. Cf. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (double-celling not cruel and
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and local level, in light of local practices, resources, and values. Such local
reforms are often slow and difficult, and are beyond the immediate
professional responsibilities of defense counsel; thus, they have too often
been neglected in favor of constitutional litigation of Bill of Rights
guarantees.
Legal educators may bear a particular heavy responsibility for this state of
affairs; our teaching 23 and scholarship have strongly emphasized the most
frequently litigated constitutional issues of criminal procedure, which in
turn helps to perpetuate and reinforce this emphasis in the minds of
students, lawyers, and policy makers. As teachers, we may claim that we
must train our students to "play the game" (and, before that. pass the bar
exam), whether or not the rules really matter: a similar justification might
be offered for the heavy emphasis on constitutional issues in our
scholarship. It is also possible, however, that we prefer constitutional law
for its greater prestige, or because emphasis on federal law shows that we are
a "national" law school, or simply because we already have a substantial
teaching and research investment in these familiar issues-I know I do.
It is time, nevertheless, to redefine our priorities and our roles as teachers.
scholars, and law reformers. Training future criminal lawyers to -play the
game" may be one of our roles as teachers, but it is not the most important
one. Law school is a "liberal arts" institution, not a trade school, and
Criminal Procedure is, or should be, a course designed for future legislators
and other public opinion leaders and policy makers, as well as for future
criminal lawyers. 24 Such a course must seek to open students' minds to

unusual punishment). Moreover. some have argued that prisoners* rights litigation
contributed to an increase in prison violence, as inmates gained increased freedom of
unsupervised movement. Lerner. supra, at 21.
23. With few exceptions, criminal law and procedure texts maximize coverage of constitutional
issues, and ignore or only briefly address problems of nonconstitutional procedure. Most
criminal law texts almost completely ignore issues of criminal justice administration and
its reform; a notable exception is Caleb Foote & Robert Levy, Criminal Law-Cases &
Materials (Boston, 1981). Criminal procedure texts are often limited entzrelv to
constitutional issues, although a few devote substantial space to nonconstitutionalized
rules and procedures, see, e.g., Yale Kamisar. Wayne LaFave & Jerold Israel. Modern
Criminal Procedure-Cases. Comments. Questions. 5th ed. (St. Paul. Minn.. 1980. and
annual supplements). Nevertheless. the primary emphasis of these broader texts (and
especially their annual supplements) still seems to be on constitutional issues, especially
search and interrogation doctrines and exclusionary rules; indeed, this material is so
voluminous that if it is not specifically deemphasized (and heavily "edited down") by the
teacher, it can easily consume almost all the available time in a three-credit, one-semester
course. As a result, criminal procedure courses probably cover very little beyond the "core"
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment material. Separate courses and seminars on criminal
justice administration or "advanced" criminal law or procedure exist in many law schools.
but they can attract only a handful of third-year students who have the prerequisite
coursework and motivation to continte their studies of criminal justice. For an example of
a text designed specifically for such a course, see Franklin Zimring & Richard S. Frase. The
Criminal Justice System: Materials on the Administration and Reform of the Criminal
Law (Boston, 1980).
24. I would agree that "liberal arts" in this context also includes developing an appreciation for
the ideals of justice reflected in constmtutional guarantees. whether or not the rules make
much difference: it lurther includes giving fIture lawyers the ability to understand. applv.
and interpret (to lients and lit' public) the sometimues mystifying decisions of court on
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issues that have not been heavily litigated but should be; to explore issues
best resolved through legal processes other than litigation (rule making and
legislation, for example); and to raise issues that are important although
difficult to resolve through any existing legal process. Similarly, I view our
roles as scholars and law reformers to be broader than simply contributing
to the development of "better" appellate case law. Indeed, our most
important roles may be to address issues, and pursue legal processes, which
courts and practicing attorneys inevitably tend to neglect.
But even if we shift our attention to these neglected issues and processes,
will it really make any difference? Many moderate and liberal criminal
procedure teachers would agree that reforms in such areas as pretrial
detention, plea bargaining, sentencing, and prison conditions are long
overdue in most jurisdictions. They might also grudgingly concede (off the
record, at least), that further preoccupation with highly refined
constitutional search and interrogation issues is unlikely to substantially
benefit defendants, suspects, citizens in general, or even our students. The
more likely objection is that the proposed nonconstitutional reforms will be
no more successful than continued litigation of search and interrogation
issues; since such reforms tend to be viewed as favorable to defendants, they
will never succeed in the current conservative political climate. Properly
understood, however, reform in each of these areas deserves, and can obtain,
"bi-partisan" support.
In the case of bail reform, it is true that unnecessary pretrial detention of
persons who would appear for trial if released hurts these defendants more
than anyone else, but society pays the bill eventually, in a variety of ways:
increased costs to build and maintain jails, lost productivity and income
taxes, increased welfare expense for dependents, disruption of stabilizing
family and community ties, and the understandable bitterness of detainees
who eventually receive probation or dismissal of their charges, or who are
coerced into pleading guilty in order to obtain immediate release from
intolerable jail conditions.25 Even if pretrial detention is viewed as a means
to prevent further crime by the accused-a purpose illegal in almost all

these issues. Again, I do not propose that we completely abandon constitutional issues,
only that we not spend practically all of our time, in the only criminal procedure course
most students will ever take, on these increasingly technical. "low payoff" issues.
25. The problem of bail and its reform is considered in Zimring and Frase, supra note 23, at
296-349. See also Hans Zeisel, The Limits of Law Enforcement (Chicago, 1982), analyzing
pretrial release and detention practices in New York City. Despite that city's reputation for
liberal pretrial release policies, Zeisel found that about one-third of felony defendants were
not released, id. at 208. Moreover, detained defendants appeared to be much more likely to
be convicted and receive custody sentences than similar defendants who obtained pretrial
release (due in part to the pressure on detained defendants to plead guilty in return for
immediate release and a sentence of "time served"). Id. at 220-27. Nevertheless, Zeisel also
found that 32 percent of detained defendants were not convicted, and another 17 percent of
all detainees were convicted but did not receive custody sentences, id. at 219: thus, about
half (49 percent) of those detained prior to trial were never found legally deserving of
custodial punishment. The policy implications of this data are discussed in Richard S.
Frase, Review Essay: Defining the Limits of Crime Control and Due Process. 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 212, 239-43 (1985).
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jurisdictions, 26 but which everyone knows is the real reason for detention in

many cases-our present indirect approach to this problem is unsatisfactory.
The use of high money bail to prevent the release of persons who might be

dangerous-with no evidence, standards, or argument directed to this
issue-results in the detention of the poorest, not necessarily the most

dangerous, defendants.

27 The

"preventive detention" of many nondangerous

persons is not only wasteful and unfair, it is also shortsighted; enforced

idleness in the company of criminals can only encourage more crime (and
more successful crime) following release.

Some conservatives also view prison reform as "coddling criminals" by
sending them to "country club prisons." Closer examination of the sordid
reality of our prison systems should serve to dispel this misconception;
although there are a few minimum security prisons that bear some physical
resemblance to a college dorm, if not a country club, none are places in
which any sane person would want to be locked up overnight. Moreover, the
vast majority of American prisons are old, overcrowded, insufficiently
28
staffed, and therefore highly dangerous to both prisoners and guards.
Imprisonment under such conditions is not only inhumane, it is self-

defeating. Since most prisoners will be released when they are still young
enough to resume their criminal careers, we must strive to make our prisons

places that at least do not make offenders more prone to crime than they
were before being imprisoned, even if we can do little to make them less so.
But the current conditions in most of our prisons seem well designed to turn
out more dedicated and skillful criminals, persons who have been
systematically brutalized, stripped of self-respect and dignity, unable to
assume the responsibilities of freedom, and trained for no calling but crime.

If a large number of them soon return to that calling, 29 we should not be

26. But see D.C. Code 23-1321 et seq., a 1970 statute authorizing the preventive detention of
defendants charged with certain violent crimes. This statute was upheld in United States v.
Edwards. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc.) See also Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, chalp. 1, Sections 201-203, 98 Stat. 1976-85 (1984). permitting
preventive detention in any federal criminal case where the court finds that "no condition
or combination of conditions [of release] will reasonably assure.., the safety of any other
person and the community." Id., Section 203. 98 Stat. 1978 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
3142(e.
27. A significant new development here is the inclusion, in the bail provisions of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supranote 26, of a statutory "right to affordable
bail." The act provides that federal magistrates and judges "may not impose a financial
condition [of release] that results in the pretrial detention of the person." Id., Section 203.
98 Stat. 1978 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.. Section 3142(c.
28. See generally, Lerner. supra note 22.
29. No one knows the true recidivism rate for persons released from prison, but we do know that
a large number of them are returned to prison within a few years. A recent study of twenty
states found that the cumulative percentages returned to prison at one, two, and three years
following release were 15 percent, 25 percent, and 31 percent. respectively. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Just. Statistics. Special Report: Returning to Prison (1984). table 1. In
some states, as many as half were returned for "technical violations" of parole conditions.
rather than conviction of a new criminal offense. on the other hand, not all offenses by such
releasees were detected, and some may have been charged with offenses in other states, Id. at
2. It is also possible that many recidivists would have returned to crime whether or not they
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surprised. For these reasons many conservatives-including Chief Justice
Warren Burger 3 0-have recognized and begun to advocate the cause of
prison reform.
Reforms of plea bargaining and sentencing practices have also received
increasing support from conservatives, who view prosecutorial and judicial
discretion as typically conferring undeserved leniency on the accused. 3' But
again, reform in these areas is, or ought to be, a "bi-partisan" issue; the
truth is, plea bargaining and uncontrolled sentencing discretion hurt
defendants and the public, sometimes in the same case. Although some
defendants receive undeserved charge 2 or sentence leniency through plea
bargaining, others are coerced into pleading guilty to charges of which they
could not be convicted at trial.33 When a defendant resists this coercion and
is convicted at trial, he may receive an unjustly harsh sentence, as
punishment for daring to exercise his constitutional rights. 34 Judicihlly
imposed sentencing disparity also has its private as well as public costs. For

30.
31.

32.

33.

34.

had been held for a time in prison, and that brutal prison conditions persuade some
inmates to give up crime. In the absence of better data on these crucial points. we must
draw our own conclusions, based on our assumptions about human nature. I suggest that it
is implausible to expect criminal propensities to remain constant or decrease as a result of
prolonged exposure, as witness, victim or perpetrator, to rape. violent assault, theft, and
destruction of property.
See. e.g.. Warren E. Burger, The Need for Change in Prisons and the Correctional System.
38 Ark. L. Rev. 711-26 (1985).
President Nixon's "crime commission" (unlike the one appointed by President Johnson),
for example, refused to accept plea bargaining as inevitable or desirable, and called for its
abolition within five years. U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Courts, Standard 3.1 (1973). Sentencing reform has also been
supported by conservatives as well as liberals. For an account of the "strange bedfellows"
coalition which helped to enact one recent sentencing reform, see Sheldon Messinger &
Phillip Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in
Determinate Sentencing: Reform or Regression? 13-57 (U.S.G.P.O., 1978), reprinted in
Zimring & Frase. supra note 23, at 950-87.
See Frase. supra note 25. at 231-33. summarizing the particular problems of "'nonlevidentiary" charge bargaining-that is, the dropping of provable charges in return for a
plea. Such problems include understating the true seriousness or frequency of defendant's
crimes, and distorting court and criminal history records; allowing prosecutors to exercise
what is essentially judicial sentencing power: and undercutting sentencing and parole
reforms.
See William Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Who Gains? Who Loses; (Institute for Law and
Social Research, Washington, 1978), reprinted in Zimring & Frase. supra note 23. at 550-58,
Using a model developed from cases that went to trial, Rhodes found that the probability of
acquittal for defendants who pled guilty in the District of Columbia was 34tpercent for
assault cases, 16 percent for robbery cases. 31 percent for larceny cases, and 32 percent for
burglary cases. Zimring & Frase. at 557.
See, e.g., Boidenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), upholding habitual offender
conviction and life sentence imposed on a defendant who refused offer to plead guilty to
initial charge ol forgery in return for a five-year prison term. Although the majority
assumed that the habitual offender charge was "fully justified by the evidence" (434 U.S. at
359), Justice Powell. dissenting, suggested that the prosecutor's decision to initially file
only the forgery charge showed that even he recognized that a life sentence would be
excessive (434 U.S. at 370-71). For an analysis of some recent data suggesting that guilty
plea defendants do both better and worse than they would if they went to trial, see Frase.
supranote 25, at 226. The general problem of plea bargaining and its reform is discussed in
Zimring & Frase, supra note 23 at 493-687.
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every defendant who gets an unduly lenient sentence from a "soft" judge,
there is another who receives unjustified severity from a "hanging" judge.35
Racial and economic biases are also likely to result from the exercise of
broad plea bargaining and sentencing discretion. But the conservatives are
still right: these defects of plea bargaining and sentencing hurt all of us, not
just certain "unlucky" defendants. Justice is the final victim, and law
enforcement loses the respect and support it must have from the public, and
from its own officials, to maintain high standards of crime control and due
process.
Why have we tolerated such a lawless system of adjudication and
punishment? The reasons are probably as complex as our society and its
legal institutions, but one important cause-the overwhelming dominance
of a few constitutional issues in criminal procedure teaching, research. and
litigation-is waning, or ought to be. Criminal procedure teachers must
begin to ask themselves whether their past efforts have been well spent. It
may be that both as a nation and as individuals, we have squandered our
idealistic energies on matters about which we can do little (at least by means
of constitutional rules of evidence), while neglecting issues that have much
more impact on the quality of criminal justice. and that may be more
responsive to reform efforts. A number of states and local jurisdictions have
already made significant progress toward reform in the areas of pretrial
detention,3 6 plea bargaining,3 7 sentencing, 8 and prison reform; 39 change is

35. See. e.g., Shari Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils. A Study of Sentencing
Disparity and Its Reduction. 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 109 (1976). finding that when federal judges
reviewed identical cases, the sentencing recommendations of some judges were as much as
58 percent more severe than the average of all judges of the same court (at 123, table 7). The
problem of sentencing disparity and reform is discussed in Zimring & Frase. supra note 23.
at 690-1006.
36. One study of pretrial release practices in twenty major cities found that the percentage of
felony defendants released in 1971 varied from a low of 38 percent to a high of 87 percent.
Wayne Thomas, Bail Reform in America 41 (Berkeley, 1976). Between 1962 and 1971. most
of these jurisdictions had substantially increased the proportion of defendants released. id.
at 40 and 41; for all twenty cities combined, the percentage released increased from 48 to 67.
See also Frase, supra note 25, at 239-44, discussing the particular importance of further
reducing pretrial detention in less serious cases, and suggesting ways to achieve this result.
37. For an evaluation of Alaska's attempt to prohibit plea bargaining as of July 1. 1975. see
Michael Rubinstein & Teresa White. Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining (Alaska Judicial
Council, 1978), reprinted in Zimring & Frase, supra note 23. at 674-84. See also Frase, supra
note 25, at 230-33 (discussing several types of plea bargaining which are particularly in
need of regulation or prohibition. and suggesting procedures to achieve this); Albert W.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea
Bargaining System. 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931-1050 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea
Bargaining Inevitable?. 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037-1107 (1984) (examining the use of court
trials instead of plea bargaining, in Philadelphia, and arguing that this approach is
affordable and preferable).
38. For a description of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, which limit both the decision
whether to impose prison as well as the length of prison terms, see Foote & Levy, supra note
23, at 825-41. The current guidelines are published in Minnesota Rules of Court 273-330
(St. Paul, Minn., 1986). The history and implementation of the Minnesota guidelines are
reported in Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. The Impact of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines: Three Year Evaluation (1984).
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possible, but much remains to be done. Perhaps the recent conservative
trend of the Supreme Court will help to shift greater attention to these
neglected issues; if so, it may well prove, even for liberals, to have been a
cloud with a silver lining.
But what if the Supreme Court's recent conservative trend moderates in
the years ahead? Indeed, what if the liberal justices "hold on" until 1988. a

Democratic president is elected, and the Court becomes more liberal again.
Or suppose a large number of state supreme courts are persuaded to

substantially expand constitutional due process protections, under state
law? Any of these scenarios might usher in a new "golden age" of

constitutional criminal procedure, at least in some states. Even then,
however, moderates and liberals must look at the reality of criminal justice
in the "best" years of the Warren Court. and ask themselves whether more
liberal search and confession rules really make much difference for most
defendants or for the rights of citizens in general. The broader thesis here is
that they do not, that there are far more important issues of criminal justice

which cry out for our attention, and that the constitutional law brain drain
must end.

Since the Minnesota Guidelines went into effect in 1980. very similar sentencing relorms
have been enacted in Washington state and for the federal courts. See Washington
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Report to the Legislature (January 10. 1983).
containing proposed guidelines applicable to felonies committed on or after July I. 198.1:
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473. chap. 11. Sections 217-236.
98 Stat. 2017-2034 (1984), creating a Federal Sentencing Guidelines Commission charged
with developing guidelines to govern sentencing of federal offenders.
39. See generally Jacobs, supra note 22. To the extent that prison overcrowding is the principal
current barrier to improved prison conditions, the solution may lie in sentencing reforms
designed specifically to stay within existing or planned prison capacity. This was one of
the explicit goals of sentencing reform in Minnesota. and the goal has been largely
achieved; Minnesota's prison population increased by only 8 percent in the four years
following implementation of the guidelines (1980-1984), whereas state prison populations
nationwide increased by 41 percent during the same period. U.S. Dept. of Justice. Bureau of
Justice, Statistics, Bulletin: Prisoners in 1984 (1985). table 3.

